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The debate about the proper approach to research in law – let alone property law – is 
one that has come to the front and centre of academic attention in recent years. Of 
course, it is not a new issue.
1
 But it has been given fresh impetus now that that 
research funding in some jurisdictions is tied to a “value for money” framework that 
sees “value” in terms of “impact” and “impact” means measurable outcomes. Or, to 
strip away the jargon-heavy vocabulary: research has to have a practical point, 
obvious to those paying for it. If this spills over into consequences for academic 
careers and career progression, either because law schools need people with funding, 
or because those making appointments believe that there is a “right” (and therefore a 
“wrong”) way to conduct research, then what could have been regarded as a diverting 
theoretical argument becomes an issue of considerably more significance.
2
 
 Like everyone approaching the question of how to research into law – whether 
we call it an analysis of research methodology or an exercise in how to fill in a grant 
application – I do not approach this free of prejudice. At the general level, however, 
my prejudice is not against (or for) any particular approach to legal scholarship. But, 
it is against the idea that one approach is to be preferred over another. The idea that 
doctrinal research into law is “dead”3 or that special “clinical” schools can be set up 
where those engaged in “merely” identifying the rules of a legal system can be 
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housed,
4
 is not offensive to me because it downgrades doctrinal scholarship: it is 
offensive because it downgrades.
5
 While it is unavoidable that scare resources for 
research will have to be allocated among a much larger pool of researchers, it 
diminishes both the argument and the protagonist if this mutates into an argument 
about why certain methodologies (and by extension those adopting them) are more 
“important” or “worthy” than others. Of course, someone will have to make a 
judgement about what to fund and who to appoint, and it is entirely right that the 
nature of the research will play a pivotal role. But that is not the same as concluding, 
or promoting the idea, that a whole way of researching should ex hypothesi be 
regarded as second rate or, even worse, denied the label “research” at all.  
It is against the background of this prejudice that I want to think about a 
doctrinal approach to property law scholarship.
6
 It is not the purpose of what follows 
to defend a doctrinal approach against those who would argue against it as a 
methodology. The purpose is to seek to explain what a doctrinal approach is, why it 
has value alongside other methodologies and what its limitations are. Where 
appropriate, I will seek to illustrate with examples of doctrinal scholarship from 
England & Wales, drawing on the extensive statutory material and the judiciary’s 
continuing development of the common law. 
 
2. The What and the How 
 
A doctrinal approach to property law is initially the search for what the law is, not 
what it should be. That does not mean to say that a scholar engaged in the search for 
the norms of, say, the law concerning registered title, is unconcerned with 
inconsistencies or conflicts, and certainly a rigorous doctrinal analysis should sit 
within the framework of the policy aims of (say) the legislation that is being analysed. 
Yet, the “research” proceeds on the basis that it is important to expose the norms 
applicable to the area of property law under examination. So, when a property lawyer 
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engaged in doctrinal research talks of critical analysis, they mean a dissection of the 
law as is, examining it for consistency and coherence, as well as a critical 
appreciation of the law in terms of policy-compatibility and future development. 
Furthermore, while it is true that “simply” stating the law looks more like rule-
identification rather than rule analysis, this often masks a much more complex task 
that is easily undervalued. For example, taking a case, and a set of rules, very familiar 
to property lawyers in this jurisdiction of all research persuasions – Stack v Dowden 
([2007] 2 AC 432, [2007] UKHL 17) and the law of implied trusts [see also Blandy; 
Eds] – any critic who suggests that a doctrinal property lawyer “simply” states what 
the case decides, clearly has not read it.
7
 In many cases, the most difficult research 
question of all is “what is the law?” and those engaged in doctrinal analysis will seek 
to answer this.  
 A doctrinal analysis of an area within property law commonly has the 
following features. Given that I would reject any attempt to rank research 
methodologies in order of importance or value, these features should not be regarded 
as prescriptive or definitional. However, they will be familiar to those engaged in the 
enterprise. 
 
(i) The researcher will focus on a reasonably well-defined area of property law, 
apparently (but not actually) in ignorance of broader conceptual concerns. The focus 
might be to examine a thread running across a wider topic (for example, the meaning 
of title guarantee under the Land Registration Act 2002, or a closed-off issue with 
well defined parameters (for example, the circumstances in which a court will order 
sale of co-owned land under section 14 of the Trusts of Land and Appointment of 
Trustees Act 1996). This can lead to the criticism that the researcher lacks “breadth of 
vision” or fails to add to the broader fund of knowledge because the author does not 
explain how this work fits into one of the “accepted” theoretical models of how 
property law works. Certainly, it is true that those engaged in doctrinal research rarely 
seek to justify their work within an over-arching theoretical framework  - such as an 
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economic analysis of law or a critical legal studies analysis - but the reason is not that 
this could not be done; it is rather that it is not the point of what is being done. 
 
(2) The research rarely commences with a literature review, at least not in the 
accepted social science sense. This is, of course, entirely consistent with the absence 
of any attempt to locate the research within a wider field of theoretical understanding. 
That is not to say, however, that those engaged in doctrinal research fail to incorporate 
academic literature. The research is not all about “the rules”. Typically, however, the 
wider literature will appear in footnotes as examples of the work of academics who 
have taken a different view of the law, or approached the topic with a different 
methodology, or who have already commented on the material. The review of the 
surrounding literature is intended to be a guide, a help to the reader, a pointer to the 
work of others: it is not typically an attempt to justify the research in terms of a theory 
that is “accepted” as the proper framework for such research. For those engaged in 
doctrinal research, no further justification is needed other than the task of identifying 
what the law is and the inconsistencies it contains. 
 
(3) It is rare for doctrinal researcher in property law to denigrate the work of others. 
This not because doctrinal researchers are saintly, or uncommonly respectful, but that 
the focus of the work is on what the law is, not how it relates to an over-arching 
conception, or even (at least initially) what the law should be. A doctrinal researcher 
is not in the business of explaining, primarily, why others are “wrong” because they 
would argue that theirs is a search for an objective statement of existing norms. Of 
course, many would challenge the assumption underpinning this – that it is possible to 
discover what the law is in isolation from the social and economic context in which it 
operates – and there is sometimes an arrogance about doctrinal scholarship that is 
unattractive. Yet, the search for apparently objective answers removes the need to 
engage in a systematic destruction of the theories of others. That is why many 
doctrinal researchers cannot quite understand the criticism of their work – which may 
lead to rejection by journals when submitted for publication – that it does not “relate 
to” or “engage with” this theory, or that theory, or the work of this or that scholar. As 
they see it, their research is not about the work of others, but about the law. Of course, 
many, many examples exist of doctrinal arguments and disagreements over what the 
law is,
8
 but rarely do they dissolve into an attack on the intellectual integrity of those 
with opposing views.  
 
(4) The methodology itself is, usually, a close textual analysis of statute and/or the 
analysis of as much case law as can be discovered. It is the examination of primary 
materials in order to reach a conclusion about either a specific problem or a 
conclusion about a set of rules – a “doctrine” – of general application. An example of 
the former is an analysis of statute and case law to see how courts approach the 
question of sale of co-owned land under section 14 of the Trusts of Land and 
Appointment of Trustees Act 1996,
9
 and of the second the use of the same working 
method to see how title guarantee and indemnity are configured under the Land 
Registration Act 2002.
10
 However, whatever the purpose of the enquiry, the first step 
is the gathering of relevant statute and case law in order to state conclusions about the 
law. In property law, for the doctrinal scholar, the more case law the better. Moreover, 
the doctrinal researcher sees value in both the process of “law discovery” and the 
result of the discovery. For many such researchers, the elucidation of the current law 
is a goal in itself, and they would argue that such an enquiry is not only necessary for 
other types of research, but is of itself sufficient to justify the energy and effort. It is, 
of course, a large claim that a sound doctrinal foundation is necessary for other types 
of research – and not one that all doctrinal researchers would subscribe to – but 
perhaps it is not going too far to suggest that a sound analysis of “where we are now” 
adds weight to work that seeks to take property law away from its rule-centric past.  
 
Certainly, those engaged in doctrinal research find it difficult to be persuaded by the 
work of scholars who make claims about what the law should be, or the policy goals it 
should implement, if that work appears to proceed without an understanding of what 
the law is now. A current example is the debate over the meaning of “guarantee” and 
“mistake” under the Land Registration Act 2002 such as would be sufficient to justify 
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an alteration or rectification of the register. There is much to be said for the view – 
even though I would not subscribe to it – that the Land Registration Act 2002 gives 
too much recognition to the formal act of title registration and too little to the general 
population’s underlying social, economic and emotional conception of “ownership”.11 
However, an argument that proceeds in ignorance or deliberate misinterpretation of 
the actual statutory provisions and the surrounding case law will carry little weight 
with a doctrinal scholar. No doubt it is not the intention, but a research methodology 
that eschews at least some assessment of the current state of the law can give the 
appearance of bending the law to fit the argument, rather than making the argument to 
change the law. 
 
(5) A typical result of a doctrinal analysis of property law is a statement of the state of 
the law as it now is, combined with an attempt to explain any revealed inconsistencies 
in the case law.
12
 However, that explanation (of the inevitable inconsistencies) is 
rarely located in an appeal to “policy” or empirical evidence, but rather in an analysis 
of why the deviant case has to be regarded as “wrongly decided” or, more 
respectfully, “decided by reference to its own special facts”. There is an 
understanding that the rules will not form an entirely cohesive and coherent doctrine, 
but there may be an unspoken desire that it should! Thus, the primary aims are usually 
synthesis, explanation and clarity. These might not be the final destination of the 
doctrinal analysis, but for many it is the sine qua non. This is, however, where much 
of the criticism of the doctrinal approach has its roots. If all that the doctrinal 
researcher is doing is stating the current law, what value does it adds to the 
advancement of legal science? After all, if we all know that water contains two 
hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, simply stating this adds nothing to the general 
fund of knowledge. Of course – so the criticism runs – people need to know what the 
law is (especially, it is implied, for the important, practical but intellectually inferior 
task of advising clients) but pointing that out is not “research”: it is “teaching”, even if 
it is accompanied by a little digging. Such “teachers” can take their place in the world 
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of legal scholarship, often in specialist institutions, but such academics bear the same 
relation to “true” researchers as roadside car mechanics do to F1 engine designers. 
Useful in getting us from A to B, but not testing the boundaries of the possible and not 
adding to the sum of human knowledge.  
 
Unsurprisingly, such an approach does not endear itself to a doctrinal researcher, or to 
practitioners for that matter [see also Malloy; Eds]. First, it begins with the mistaken 
assumption that it is a straightforward matter to determine what the law actually is. I 
do not mean by this that it is unclear how the known law might be applied to novel 
fact situations. That is the stuff of everyday legal practice and, of course, is something 
that all types of property law researcher has an interest in. Rather, it is the recognition 
that “the law” itself might be unclear, as where an apparently simply statutory phrase 
has no determined meaning, or case law is inconsistent. An example of the former is 
the meaning of “mistake” within Schedule 4 to the Land Registration Act 2002, and 
the later the scope of implied trusts after Stack v Dowden. It is not a question of 
“simply” reading the statute or the cases to find out what the law is, but instead 
requires the application of critical skills and synthesis. Secondly, in many cases, the 
rejection of the value of the search for the law as it now is carries with it an inherent, 
but hidden, diminishing of the value of exposition as an educative tool. The idea that 
an academic who is interested in discovering what the law is, is fit “merely” to be a 
teacher (because anyone can discover what the law is), and that teaching can be left to 
those who cannot “research” is, thankfully, not one that has much credit in common 
law jurisdictions. It is misplaced because the skills of analysis that make a good 
doctrinal researcher, are the same skills needed by good teachers and by good 
researchers engaged in other research methodologies. For a doctrinal scholar, teaching 
and research are complimentary, not alternatives. If you do not know that two 
hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom makes water, how do you know whether you 
can drink the colourless liquid in your glass, and how will you exploit all its potential? 
 
3. The Why and the Why Not 
 
While legal research rightly now embraces all types of research methodologies, 
doctrinal analysis has been the predominant mode of research in the common law 
world and perhaps more so in property than any other area of law. There is a good 
reason for this. Land is a fixed, finite and immoveable resource. It forms the basis of 
much economic activity and personal wealth. There is a considerable amount of 
policy-based and empirical research which demonstrates that guarantee of title, easy 
alienability of interests and security of lending is critical to economic growth.
13
 This 
is a message taken seriously by most common law property jurisdictions.
 14
 It was at 
the heart of the great property reforms in England and Wales in 1925 and is a primary 
reason for the reform of the land registration system by the Land Registration Act 
2002.
15
 In such an atmosphere, it is plain that there needs to be certainty about the 
legal rules. Thus, in the field of property law, doctrinal analysis which seeks to 
identify and codify the rules, based on statute and precedent, supports what is seen to 
be a core function of property law.
16
 Doctrinal analysis has a value in property law 
that almost speaks for itself.
17
 
 That, however, can make doctrinal property law scholars lazy. Knowing that 
the identification of legal rules is a valuable goal in itself, because legal certainty is so 
important in property law,
18
sometimes encourages the belief that this approach should 
be the start and the end of the enquiry. However, if this - the identification of existing 
rules - is the limit of the enquiry, then doctrinal research will fail to engage with the 
wider research community and fails to address the social and economic reality in 
which the rules sit. There is a point in rule identification – but the point of rule 
identification is not the identification. It is to provide a framework for those lawyers 
that advise clients; to help define the problem for those that seek to develop the law in 
order to achieve policy goals; to help those who would persuade others, on the basis 
of empirical evidence, that the existing law is failing to achieve its aims; and to ensure 
that there is confidence in the integrity and objectivity of the legal system. Take Stack 
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v Dowden. The doctrinal scholar has problems with the judgment in this case because 
it generates uncertainty and lacks coherency with previous rules. It is even difficult to 
determine what the ratio decidendi of the case is – the worst kind of uncertainty for a 
doctrinal scholar. But simply making this point, and suggesting that the decision 
cannot be followed save in cases falling within its own factual limits
19
 (i.e. where land 
is held jointly and there is uncertainty about the beneficial entitlement), misses the 
target and consequently undersells the value of doctrinal scholarship. It ignores the 
policy questions around who should own co-habited property; it ignores the empirical 
research that reveals that “the law” of co-ownership is misunderstood and falling 
behind the reality of how people live their lives; it ignores the economic and social 
impact of imprecision and fails to measure it; and it reinforces the idea that doctrinal 
research is pedestrian and uninformed. In other words, doctrinal scholarship in a 
vacuum loses much of its value. 
 
4. The where next 
 
There is a perception, and perhaps it is no more than that, that the heyday of doctrinal 
legal scholarship has passed. Certainly, it is not a novel methodology and unlikely to 
be “the next best thing”. It can be criticised as being outmoded, harking back to a time 
when both research and teaching was rigid and black letter. The implication is that it 
is not fit for purpose in the modern legal world. Doctrinal scholars sometimes counter 
this by pleading that the skills required to engage in a critical analysis and synthesis of 
a mass of primary materials are not easily come by. The implication is that doctrinal 
analysis is “hard” and those who eschew it, cannot do it. Neither of these assertions 
are helpful, and both are misplaced. There is, of course, a role for all types of research 
methodology in property law and, as noted above, doctrinal research supports one of 
the core concerns of modern property law - legal certainty. But not only do other 
methodologies dispute that legal certainty should be the main concern of land law, 
they challenge the smug certainty of the doctrinal scholar that the systemisation of 
legal rules is inherently valuable. It is up to doctrinal scholars to meet the challenges 
revealed by other methodologies and to explain why what they do is important. 
Failing to do that is a failure of doctrinal legal scholarship. 
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